Nixon, Richard. Seize the Moment: America's Challenge in a One-Superpower World. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992.

Date: July 24, 1994

Nixon's experience in foreign policy pervades this well-organized discussion of America's roll in post-cold war international affairs. The book begins with a description of the politico-economic world in the early 1990's. In this introduction, he lists three myths that he claims arose and dominated foreign policy debate following the events of 1989 (p21):

1. The myth of the end of history.

- The history of rivalry of trade and democracy against central planning and

dictators has not simply ended with the end of the U.S.-Soviet cold war.

2. The myth of the irrelevance of military power.

3. The myth of the decline of America.

Each chapter focuses on a specific geopolitical region of the world and begins with a brief history and a concise, informative description of the state of affairs in the region. Nixon prescribes specific policy goals for the U.S. regarding each region or nation. These are summarized as follows:

Regarding Europe, Nixon notes four facts on which U.S. policy in Europe has been based:

1. Soviet military presence in the heart of Europe.

2. Soviet imperial domination over Eastern Europe.

3. Soviet-imposed division of Germany.

4. Fragmented and vulnerable Western Europe.

Further egarding Europe, Nixon suggests 5 pillars (p127).

1. NATO guarantees for Eastern Europe.

2. U.S. activism in Eastern Europe.

3. Close U.S.-German pertnership.

4. An open-door policy vis-a-vis the newly independent republics of the Soviet Union.

5. Restructuring NATO for new missions.

Regarding Japan, Nixon suggests 5 goals (p154).

1. Enhance cooperative development of defense-related technologies.

2. Increase Japanese economic aid to strategic countries.

3. Provide funds to facilitate solutions of regional conflicts.

4. Subsidize U.S.-led efforts to develop security arrangements for the Persian Gulf.

5. Provide economic aid to the democratic republics of the former Soviet Union as part of a comprehensive geopolitical accommodation.

Regarding China, Nixon prescribes work along four fronts (p173).

1. Increase U.S. economic engagement in China.

2. Foster peaceful political change.

i. Resume high-level dialogue.

ii. Increase cultural and aducational exchange programs.

iii. Open two international broadcasting stations

- Radio Free China and Radio Free Tibet.

3. Make China pay a price for geopolitical irresponsibility.

- Embargos on high-tech items.

4. Enhance Taiwan's international political standing.

Regarding the Muslim world, Nixon lists three basic currents of thought into which the

diverse Muslim political movements fall: fundamentalism, radicalism, modernism. Primary radical leaders are Assad of Syria, Hussein of Iraq, Qaddafi of Libya.

Nixon prescribes developing partnerships with modernist states such as the democracies of Turkey and Pakistan; Egypt and Indonesia, though not democracies, have relatively open societies with which to cultivate relations.

In regards to the potential instability arising in the Muslim world due to the end of the cold war, Nixon poses three "fatal illusions" to avoid in U.S. foreign policy (p210):

1. The illusion of a comprehensive security framework.

- A regional pact would bunstable due to local conflicts and internal threats.

2. The illusion of regional arms control.

3. The illusion of redistribution of regional wealth.

Regarding Israel, Nixon notes the occasional conflict in interest between Israel and oil.

He contends that the U.S. should never and will never allow Israel to be defeated, but that in the interest of Arab relations, the U.S. should not accept Israel's unyielding policy regarding the occupied territories. He poses four objectives for a U.S.-mediated peace settlement (p224):

1. full diplomatic recognition of Israel by its neighbors,

2. secure borders for Israel,

3. return to Arab states of territories captured in 1967, and

4. self-government for the Palistinians.

Regarding developing nations, Nixon summarizes three strategic interests (p235):

1. Unlock the untapped economic potential of developing countries.

2. Avoid participation in deadly regional conflict through current involvement.

3. Foster economic opportunity in the underdeveloped world to negate the flooding of

our borders by economic refugees.

Nixon characterizes four successful developing nations, which he refers to as the four Asian tigers: Tiawan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore. He lists five keys to their successful development (p240):

1. Base development on the foundation of competitive markets.

2. Invest in human capital.

3. Keep the economic burden of government low.

4. Create conditions to attract foreign investment.

5. Make exports the engine of economic growth.

Returning to his discussion of impoverished political and economic systems, Nixon discusses four fronts on which U.S. strategy should advance (p262):

1. Assist population control programs.

2. Reduce trade barriers to exports from the underdeveloped world.

3. Improve the effectiveness of economic assistance.

i. Give aid on the basis of strict conditionality.

ii. Give aid on a bilateral basis, not multilateral.

iii. Establish "enterprise funds" for market oriented reforms.

4. Facilitate debt relief.

In each section of the book, Nixon clearly breaks from his general description of the world into specific, thorough and well-outlined policy objectives for the U.S.. The writing is straight-forward, confident and easy to read. The content is informative and insightful and considers the wide range on agendas pertaining to a given issue.

Although I could not bring myself to read the lengthy discussion of the Soviet Union in the chapter entitled "The Former Evil Empire", I found the discussions of the Pacific rim, the Muslim world and the developing nations extremely educational from both a positive and normative perspective. I would suggest this reading for anyone who, like myself, is not well versed in foreign affairs and the United States' interests abroad.

J. Sprigg

POST: A peace treaty was just signed by Prime Minister Rabeem of Israel and

(7-25-94) King Hussein of Jordan on the White House lawn. Media analysts suggest that

such a peace agreement between Israel and Syria is likely in the future, but that

Syria seeks concessions from the U.S. for such an agreement in the form of "a lot

of money."